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Does Douglass North Offer an Original Research 
Agenda to Analyse the Relationships Between 
Education and Economic Performance? 
Claude Diebolt  
Abstract: »Liefert Douglass North eine originelle Forschungsagenda um die 
Verhältnisse zwischen Bildung und ökonomischer Leistungsfähigkeit zu analy-
sieren?«. Douglass North offers an interesting alternative when he suggests 
that institutions and the resulting organisations play an essential role in ex-
plaining the economic performance of nations. Among these organisations, as 
an extension of North’s work, we find educational systems and in particular 
university systems. According to the type of institutions, these organisations 
act either towards increased competition, innovation, the search for productiv-
ity and entrepreneurship, or on the contrary towards rent seeking activities, 
thus discouraging productive activities. 
Keywords: North, education, economic performance, cliometrics. 
 
If the proper choice of a model depends on the institutional context 
– and it should – then economic history performs the nice function 
of widening the range of observation available to the theorist. Eco-
nomic theory can only gain from being taught something about the 
range of possibilities in human societies. Few things should be more 
interesting to a civilized economic theorist than the opportunity to 
observe the interplay between social institutions and economic be-
haviour over time and place (Solow, 1985, p. 329). 
 
As opposed to those authors who belong to the tradition of endogenous growth 
– who consider that social institutions are irrelevant or at best secondary in 
analysing development processes – Douglass North seems to offer an interest-
ing alternative when he suggest that the institutional framework and the result-
ing organisations play an essential role in explaining the economic performance 
of nations. Regularised interaction schemes are devised to take into account a 
complexity that standard economics cannot reveal. In more formal terms, insti-
tutions are all the rules of the games, or in other words “[…] the humanly de-
vised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.” 
(North, 1991, p. 97). 
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North stresses how important it is to take transaction costs into account in 
economic analysis. From his point of view, together with the transformation 
costs, they define the production costs in the economy. 
In 1960, Coase showed that in case there are no transaction costs, the mar-
ket-based allocation maximises the total product independent of property 
rights. But as soon as the transaction costs are not equal to zero, this is not the 
case any more. From that point of view, the transaction costs are expected to 
increase with the development of the economy, since the increased size of the 
market entails a growing number of transactions (Coase, 1960). 
If game theory shows that it is rather easy to secure cooperation in order to 
benefit from the profits of exchanges in small groups, this becomes much more 
difficult in bigger groups (see for instance the one-shot prisoner dilemma). This 
could be considered as the origin of the emergence of a third party, namely the 
State, in order to make sure that the contracts are honoured. 
Hence the State and institutions in general seem necessary to reduce the un-
avoidable (irreducible) uncertainty which presides over human interactions. 
They participate in the process of reducing transaction costs by providing a 
stable and predictable framework for contractual relations. That is their major 
advantage. Institutions, set up at the very beginning of social life, are necessar-
ily efficient. It is the balance of power between individuals and the groups 
forming society which contribute to their definition. Once they are considered 
satisfying, they crystallise over time. Once they exist, they create a network of 
incentives among which organisations emerge, which in turn strengthen the 
resulting institutional structure (cf. David’s concept of path dependence, 2007). 
Among these organisations, as an extension of North’s work, we find educa-
tional systems and in particular university systems. According to the type of 
institutional framework, these organisations act either towards increased com-
petition, innovation, the search for productivity and entrepreneurship, or on the 
contrary towards rent seeking activities, thus discouraging productive activities. 
The underlying idea is that efficient institutions are one of the keys of the 
economic success of a nation: they provide positive incentives for productive 
activity which means that these organisations all promote the economy. It is 
therefore essential, in a given economy, to study the nature and evolution of 
incentives which orientate the action of agents. 
From a methodological viewpoint, North takes into account the historical 
(irreversible) time dimension and proposes a research programme which par-
tially departs from strict methodological individualism. He considers first feed-
backs from society to individuals, even if those individuals did set up the insti-
tutions in the first place. These institutions limit the choices available to 
individuals by distorting the nature of the incentives they face. Hence there 
would be a moderate individualism where individuals would set up institutions 
in order to reduce the uncertainty attached to their individual behaviours but 
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where these social set ups would at the same time have an impact on individual 
behaviours. 
We suggest using this approach to account for various phenomena. On the 
one hand, to understand the origin of institutions of higher education consid-
ered as organisation structures looking for their own interests within given 
structures. On the other hand, to analyse the choices provided by institutions of 
higher education (structure of training supply) and the decisions made by indi-
viduals (student who choose their training areas), in connection with the set of 
incentives devised by institutions. 
North considers that the type of knowledge, skills and learning to which 
members of an organisation commit themselves reflect the benefits – incentives 
– integrated in institutional constraints. This process presents increasing out-
puts. The nature of institutions which govern the functioning of a society influ-
ences in a decisive way the type of knowledge which will be looked for. This 
knowledge might or might not promote economic development. If the basic 
institutional structure makes the reallocation of wealth (and not production) 
economically more attractive (profitable), one should expect a very different 
development of knowledge and skills than in a frame of productivity enhancing 
activities which would seem more profitable (such as the chemical industry in 
the 20th century). These are quite extreme examples but as such they constitute 
ideal-types which account for a large part of economic history. 
The general institutional structure is expressed in incentives to acquire one 
type of knowledge rather than another. This demand leads to the emergence of 
organisations which try and draw a profit by supplying this type of compe-
tence. The supply structure of teaching in turn reflects the incentives to be 
found within the institutional structure of society. It should therefore be taken 
into account that the supply of and demand for qualifications are not independ-
ent from the more general organisation of society. Moreover a balance between 
supply of and demand for qualifications does not guarantee an optimal situation 
as far as long term economic development of a society is concerned. Such a 
balance might hide two opposite situations. 
In the first situation institutions are efficient and devise incentives to act in a 
way which will promote the development of the productive capacities of a 
community. In such a framework supply of and demand for qualifications will 
most likely also promote development. In addition politicians’ and voters’ 
perceptions of the value of such an investment will evolve. The final result will 
reinforce the initial perception of the complementarity between economic per-
formance and investment in growth and the dissemination of knowledge. 
In the second situation, institutions are not efficient. They create incentives 
to acquire knowledge leading to useless or harmful activities for long term 
economic development. From a historical point of view such would be the case 
in many third world countries, where many higher education students choose to 
study law and political science in order to get a job in the administration, which 
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is the source of low income, prestige and power. The levies on the profit of 
entrepreneurial activity both by these civil servants as well as by imposed fam-
ily solidarity have a strong decreasing impact on the incentives connected with 
this type of activities. A stable situation is thus created in which economic 
agents, while acting rationally, contribute to maintaining their community in a 
state of under-development. 
This idea is rather old in social thought. Tocqueville (1856) was the first to 
suggest such an approach. In his book L’Ancien régime et la Révolution (The 
Old Regime and the Revolution), he tried to explain why at the end of the 18th 
century capitalist agriculture and trade did not develop in France at the same 
speed as in England. The main reason was that in Ancien Régime France the 
very level of administrative centralisation meant that the State had more pres-
tige than in England and that State positions were more numerous and more 
sought after. Hence when a land owner had the choice between staying on his 
property and striving to improve its output on the one hand and acquiring a 
royal office in town on the other, he usually chose latter. 
According to North, whereas the distribution of knowledge in society can be 
explained by the theory of investment in human capital, the development of 
formal education and of the types of socially valued knowledge can be ex-
plained by the institutional characteristics of a society. Hence North has his 
doubts about he self-regulatory capacity of human capital markets. If institu-
tions are inefficient, aggregating individually rational decisions will keep soci-
ety on a sub-optimal trajectory. This explains how difficult it becomes to im-
plement social change. North’s argument could actually be used to argue in 
some cases in favour of a strong external intervention in order to radically 
modify the institutions on which the functioning of societies are based. 
For North, there are two efficiency concepts. The first one, allocative effi-
ciency, is well known by economists, leading to Pareto’s efficiency conditions. 
The other, adaptive efficiency, concerns the type of rules which shape the way 
economy evolves over time and which generate a society’s wish and ability to 
acquire knowledge, to induce innovation, to run risks and to get involved in 
creative activities. 
In order for a society to evolve, it must insist on allowing trials, errors and 
experimentation in order to learn how to solve problems over time. Decentral-
ised decision making must be encouraged in order to allow society to maximise 
the efforts required to solve problems which might be either stochastic or sys-
tematic, i.e. ideological. 
In North’s work, institutional rules are strongly influenced par a liberal 
commitment. Competition, decentralised decision-making and specific con-
tracts and property rights are considered as indispensable elements of a good 
organisational efficiency. Laissez-faire is not necessarily the most adequate 
solution to guarantee the optimal reacting ability of institutions to society’s 
needs. 
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For instance, what is the ability of institutions of higher education to react to 
changing demands of those who make use of their degrees: the State and pri-
vate firms mainly? 
This question is obviously most topical both in France and abroad. 
As public means become increasingly limited, they must be used in the most 
productive way. The production of quasi-public goods, such as education in 
decentralised institutions suggests that incentives must be devised which guar-
antee that a product corresponding to the needs and wishes of users will be 
supplied at the lowest possible cost.  
On a more aggregate level, one could also say that public funding of higher 
education can only be justified in so far as this investment benefits society as a 
whole, in particular through its contribution to economic performance. One 
could consider that higher education, which generates externalities, does actu-
ally contribute. However not all agree on this point. Some think that one should 
distinguish between disciplines and some consider that a specific threshold of 
technical and economic development should be reached before higher educa-
tion can effectively contribute to growth. 
There is another possible explanation which would lie in the role of institu-
tions. Institutions which are not that favourable to the creation of wealth are not 
favourable either to economic performance (by offering for instance curricula 
aimed more at extracting rents than aimed at innovation and technology, i.e. 
humanities against scientific and engineering disciplines). As individual 
choices will be affected by the same incentives, a situation may arise where the 
training supply would meet a demand, where educational markets would be 
balanced and where individual choices would be rewarded by high salaries, but 
where the talents and the nation as a whole would be trapped in economic 
under-development! 
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